Disputes regarding the effectiveness of the patent system focus on the appropriate scope of patent rights. This Article departs from the traditional debate and looks instead at the players regulated by the patent system. This Article shows that the patent system fails to effectively encourage technological dissemination because it focuses on the patent owner and his competitors but largely ignores a crucial player: the ordinary user.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of the patent system argue that it fails to achieve its goal of advancing progress. They argue that it fails to advance progress through the promotion of innovation and dissemination because Congress and the courts have overly expanded patent owners' rights.
1 This Article focuses on the dissemination of new technologies-their social adoption process. It offers a novel outlook on patent law's failure to effectively encourage the dissemination of new technologies. 2 Instead of focusing on the strength of patent rights, it points to the patent system's neglect of an important class of players which has a critical influence on technological dissemination. The patent system focuses on the patent owner and his competitors while it largely fails to acknowledge the significant role of the ordinary user-even the couch potato-in his important everyday decisions to adopt or not adopt a new technology. 3 User decisions determine the fate of many technologies. For example, electronic book readers, such as the Kindle and the Nook, currently flood our markets. Users of electronic readers can instantaneously purchase and carry with them a practically unlimited number of weightless books that users can easily read off the device's screen. Yet many potential users refuse to purchase electronic readers-they prefer the comfort of the oldfashioned paper book and lament a world of bare library walls no longer adorned by books. 4 Similarly, handwritten health records in hospitals and physicians' offices can now be replaced with electronic records that 2. The goal of this Article is not to replace the traditional insights regarding the impact of the scope of patent rights on the effectiveness of the patent system. Instead, the objective of the Article is to shed additional light on the problems that underlie the effectiveness of the patent system and expand the existent discourse.
3. Few scholars address the importance of the social acceptance of a technology by the users. For GIFT-GIVING PERIOD 2 (2012) , available at http://libraries.pewinternet.org/files/legacy-pdf/Pew_Tablets%20and%20e-readers%20double%201. 23.2012.pdf ( showing that although the rate of e-reader ownership is rising steadily, as of 2012, the majority of the U.S. population still does not own e-readers); see also Shantella Y. Sherman & James Wright, eBooks Come of Age, WASH. INFORMER (Sept. 1, 2010) , http://washingtoninformer.com/ news/2010/sep/01/ebooks-come-of-age (discussing concerns regarding the demise of books and libraries). centralize all available records about a patient and reduce errors caused by illegible handwriting and missing information. Yet some of the systems' users-medical professionals who are unfamiliar with the novel technology-resist. They claim that the entry of information into the system detracts from their ability to focus on their medical duties. 5 In both cases, it is neither the patent owner nor the competitors who are responsible for the extent of dissemination of the technologies. Instead, regular everyday users are the ones who play this vital role.
This Article begins by examining the patent system's tools that are designed to promote the dissemination of inventions once they enter the market. It examines two doctrines-compulsory licensing and patent misuse-and demonstrates that both doctrines focus on the patent owner and his competitors to indirectly nudge the user. Misconduct of the patent owner can trigger both doctrines, which then look to the patent owner's competitors to facilitate dissemination as they increase production and reduce prices. In essence, these doctrines treat competition as a proxy for dissemination; they assume that if price is reduced and availability increased, innovations will attain increased user adoption. 6 Patent law focuses on the patent owner and his competitors because it contains a simplistic view of the user as motivated by only price and availability. This Article uncovers a more nuanced view of the ordinary user by providing a taxonomy of reasons for user resistance to adopting new technologies. It identifies two main sources of user resistance to new technology: novelty and perceived consequences of adopting the technology. Users who resist a technology due to its novelty may resist the novelty of the hardware, as in the case of electronic book readers, or they may resist the novelty of the technology's complexity. At the same time, users may resist a technology due to perceived economic consequences of the technology, such as employees' fears of being replaced by technology; owners' reluctance to lose investments in older technologies; and the unattractiveness of a technology that has yet to achieve a critical mass of users. Users may also fear noneconomic adverse effects, such as fear of genetically modified food because of potential effects on personal health or the environment. Finally, they may resist a technology because they view it as a threat to their moral or religious values, such as the fear that human cloning will impact the uniqueness of human identity. & TECH. 103, 112-19 (2008) (describing the benefits of electronic health record systems).
6. See infra Part I. 7. See infra Part II.
While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the patent system, the prevailing view is that the market efficiently determines which technologies society eventually adopts. Yet relying solely on market governance to control the adoption of new technologies is problematic. First of all, reliance on market governance can carry grave costs. History is replete with adoptions of important and eventually successful technologies that society resisted or delayed for decades and even centuries. Secondly, the belief that the market alone determines the fate of new technologies is, in fact, unfounded. The government, on all levels, regularly intervenes in many subtle and some unsubtle ways to encourage users to adopt new technologies. 8 The technology-regulating regime is charged with the promotion of progress. 9 Yet patent law, which focuses on innovation and encouraging competition, executes only part of this mission through rules enforcing compulsory licensing and patent misuse remedies. This Article underscores the need for broader, systematic thinking and coordination of the technology-regulating regime to directly encourage user adoption of patented and unpatented technologies alike. 10 The goal of this Article is not to set a norm of government action. In fact, some technologies are unsuccessful inventions that users legitimately resist.
11 Yet governmental action to promote user adoption is already taking place on a broad scale through Congress, federal agencies, and state and local governments. Presently, though, these efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated, and inconsistent.
12
While it does not focus on institutional design, this Article builds on the important work done by Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, who propose an "Office of Innovation Policy" to coordinate government 8. See infra Part III. 9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 10 . The assumption that underlies this project is that technological innovation is a primary contributor to long-term well-being. Specifically, this Article relies on writings that describe how biological and agricultural innovations decrease disease and hunger and contribute to health; how innovations in communications and information technologies contribute to educational, political, and social development; and how innovation generally propels economic growth, which contributes to increased and more egalitarian well-being. agencies' decision-making regarding innovation. 13 The articulation and enforcement of guidelines to promote user adoption through the type of agency proposed by Benjamin and Rai could improve the coherency and consistency of government policies. Such guidelines could identify when governmental action to encourage user adoption is particularly warranted or when it may be unnecessary, and could lay out effective action modes.
Opponents of government action to encourage user adoption point to the difficult process of selecting winning technologies. They caution that the government is likely to err and encourage the adoption of mediocre technologies, perhaps even at the expense of superior ones. To address this concern, this Article proposes that the government should limit its action to gentle nudges to encourage user adoption. Government should not be coercive and mandate the adoption of a particular new technology, making it the only viable option. Furthermore, this Article proposes that government action should be limited only to new classes of technology, which is where user resistance is most likely to occur, and should not advance one competing technology over another. 14 Finally, this Article argues that although market forces can overcome some instances of user resistance, government action is particularly warranted in cases of market failure. This inquiry takes the first step to indicate the usefulness of systematic thought about government action to encourage user adoption. To do so, it identifies cases in which government action is particularly warranted, and through that it sheds light on where such action may not be necessary and the market may be better suited to overcome user resistance. This Article highlights two instances of market failure that could warrant government action. These scenarios are not meant to be an exhaustive list. The first scenario is where a technology is characterized by network effects and requires the attainment of critical mass to achieve widespread adoption. The second scenario involves cases of urgency-where time is of the essence.
15
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines post-market-entry patent law doctrines to reveal patent law's overly simplistic view of the players who influence technological dissemination. Part II highlights the important role of the user's everyday technological adoption decisions and provides a taxonomy of causes for user resistance. Part III reveals the risks of sole reliance on market governance for the adoption of new technologies. Part IV highlights the need for an institutional actor to articulate and enforce systematic guidelines for identifying when encouragement of user adoption through gentle nudges is warranted. Part V highlights two instances of market failure in which action to encourage user adoption would be warranted.
I. THE PATENT SYSTEM'S ROLE POST-MARKET ENTRY Scholars, judges, and litigants generally agree that patent law is charged with the promotion of progress through advancement of both innovation and dissemination. 16 Yet the parties disagree as to whether the patent system executes its mission effectively.
17
Critics of the patent system focus on the effect of strong patent rights on innovation and argue that broad patent rights impede subsequent innovation.
18 It appears that the focus on innovation may have obstructed a careful examination of the patent system's treatment of dissemination. Far fewer critics focus on dissemination and those who do so generally extend the innovation prism to criticize the patent system's effect on dissemination. Specifically, they argue that strong patent owner rights enable patent owners to increase prices beyond the threshold intended for patent monopoly, and thereby unjustifiably restrict public access.
19
This Part sheds light on the patent system's failure to effectively promote dissemination, and shows that patent law cannot execute its mission because it fails to adequately account for all the players who 16. For discussions of innovation and progress, see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2264-68 (describing how academics, legislators, and courts celebrate innovation as the promoter of progress). India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 , 1580 -81 (2009 influence technological dissemination. Patent law doctrines focus on the patent owner and his competitors but largely ignore the crucial role of the ordinary user. In essence, patent law treats competition as a proxy for dissemination, assuming that once the price barrier is eliminated through competition, dissemination will be accomplished.
Many patent law doctrines are designed to achieve a balance between incentivizing the patent owner and promoting the general public welfare by encouraging the dissemination of new technologies. 20 Yet the doctrines that directly affect dissemination are those that regulate the invention after it enters the market. This Part examines two doctrines that apply to the invention after its market entry: compulsory licensing and patent misuse. It will show that both doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and his competitors, aiming only indirectly to nudge the ordinary user's decision-making through the reduction of price. Both doctrines treat competition as a proxy for dissemination and assume that once the price barrier is removed, then dissemination will occur.
A. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is intended to encourage dissemination of inventions in the marketplace. Unlike most of patent law, which focuses on the earlier stages of the technological process, compulsory licensing focuses on the dissemination stage and seeks to enhance the use of the technology. Under this doctrine, the government issues a compulsory license that permits a party other than the patent owner to make, use, or sell a patented invention without the patent owner's consent. 21 Compulsory licenses usually, although not always, provide for royalty payments to the patent owner. 22 20. For example, the exclusivity period is limited to twenty years to ensure that after a limited period for profit-making, competitors can produce and disseminate the invention more broadly. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the term of the patent shall be for twenty years from application). Similarly, the goal of the disclosure requirement is to release information about the patented invention that competitors can use to disseminate the invention once the patent expires. Id. § 112(a) (requiring that a patent application contain a written description enabling any person skilled in the art to make the invention The ultimate goal of compulsory licensing is to increase availability and reduce the price of the technology in order to enhance dissemination and encourage user adoption. Yet compulsory licensing focuses on the actions of the patent owner and her competitors. Although the law's objective is to encourage user adoption, the law contains a simplistic view of the user as motivated by availability and price alone. Therefore, it concentrates on deciphering and influencing the conduct of the patent owner and her competitors. First, the patent owner's actions or failures to act instigate the issuance of a compulsory license in three of the four situations in which a government issues compulsory licenses: anticompetitive behavior, patent nonuse, and refusal to license to a dependent patent. As for the fourth public interest category, some causes, such as a sudden need for a drug, are not related to the patent owner's behavior. Yet other causes-which include refusal to increase manufacturing, refusal to license to additional manufacturers, or refusal to lower prices despite public need-stem from the patent owner's conduct. Hence, in most cases, governments issue compulsory licenses as an antidote to a patent owner's behavior that limits dissemination of an invention.
While the patent owner's conduct instigates the issuance of compulsory licenses, the law of compulsory licensing focuses on the patent owner's competitors to resolve the dissemination problem. By compelling the papers/documents/OuttersonK052009.pdf (discussing the U.S. position that compulsory licenses under TRIPS should be limited to certain diseases patent owner to license to competitors, the law seeks increased production of the invention to promote increased dissemination. While the debate surrounding compulsory licensing mostly focuses on the effect of compulsory licenses on innovation, 34 the underlying assumption is that the issuance of compulsory licensing would improve access directly or indirectly by reducing price. 35 Hence, the law of compulsory licensing uses competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on increasing availability and eliminating the price barrier.
B. Patent Misuse
Patent misuse originally developed as a common law equitable affirmative defense to an infringement claim similar to the traditional Unclean Hands Doctrine in tort law. Defendants sued for patent infringement may claim as a defense that the patent owner misused her patent grant.
36 If the defense is successful, the patent is effectively unenforceable. Courts will refuse to grant the patent owner an injunction or damages until the patent owner stops any misuse and until the effects of the misuse dissipate.
37
The patent misuse defense applies when the patent owner takes unfair advantage of his patent rights in the market. licensee's ability to resell units of the patented invention; 40 requirements that the licensee pay royalties beyond the patented invention (e.g., royalties based on the licensee's total sales or continued payment of royalties after the patent expires); 41 and tying arrangements that require the licensee to purchase other things from the patent owner in addition to the subject matter claimed in the patent (e.g., agreements that require the licensee to purchase unpatented supplies).
42
Protection of competition appears to be a core concern of the patent misuse defense.
43 Similar to compulsory licensing, patent misuse attempts to encourage dissemination by encouraging competition. The goal is for competitors to raise patent misuse as a defense in order to increase availability and reduce price for the end user. Yet while the law carefully considers the conduct and motivation of the patent owner and his competitors, it addresses the user only indirectly. In all patent misuse cases, the law focuses on the acts of the patent owner who has taken unfair advantage of the patent and solves the problem by absolving the owner's 30-31, 33-34 (1931) (where the patent owner tied the sale of his patented invention to the sale of unpatented carbon dioxide).
43. Many scholars point to the language of the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing v. AMF, which reframed the test with antitrust competition terminology and stated that "the alleged infringer [must] show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'physical or temporal scope' of the grant with anticompetitive effect." Windsurfing Int'l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986 ); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 913 (2007) (citing Windsurfing and stating that the "Federal Circuit itself has come to define patent misuse as 'impermissibly broaden[ing] the "physical or temporal scope"' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effects" (alteration in original)). Some commentators note that patent misuse law goes beyond the traditional competition objectives of antitrust law because for some patent licensing arrangements, courts apply the per se rule, which does not investigate whether the arrangement, in fact, affects competition. See, e.g., Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 401, 436-38, 449 (2003) . Yet although courts that evaluate licensing investigations under the per se rule do not look at the effects on competition in the specific case, they assume that the restriction is so onerous that the restrictions must affect competition. competitors from liability for patent infringement. For example, courts that hold that a tie-in constitutes patent misuse prevent the patent owner's unjustifiable inhibition of competition in technologies that are related to the patented invention. By defining the act as patent misuse and preventing the patent owner from enforcing his patent, courts strengthen the patent owner's competitors under the assumption that competition will lower prices, increase availability, and thereby enhance dissemination of these related technologies. 44 Hence, the law of patent misuse, like the law of compulsory licensing, focuses primarily on the patent owner and his competitors and embodies a simplistic view of the user as motivated by availability and price alone.
II. THE USER AND THE DISSEMINATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Patent law doctrines focus on the actions of the patent owner and his competitors. The goal of the doctrines is to ensure a low price and increased availability of the technology. The assumption underlying these laws is that technological dissemination is dependent on availability and price alone. The market narrative presumes that once the price is lowered and the technology is widely available, then the market will determine which technology is worthy of adoption. Yet the market narrative is lacking.
45
This Part will uncover the important role of the ordinary user in determining the fate of new technologies. It will also present a more nuanced view of the user. It will show that the market narrative is lacking because the ordinary user is not motivated by price and availability alone. This Part reveals that there are many sources of motivation for the ordinary user to resist a new technology. Specifically, this Part will categorize these reasons into two broad categories: resistance due to novelty and resistance due to the perceived consequences of the technology.
A. The Impact of the User's Adoption Decision
Scholars recently looked beyond the inventor or creator to the role of the user in influencing technological design. These scholars emphasize that the user's values and preferences shape the technology he uses. However, these scholars do not focus on the ordinary user, but rather focus on the 44. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am., 283 U.S. at 33-34 ("The Dry Ice Corporation has no right to be free from competition in the sale of solid carbon dioxide. Control over the supply of such unpatented material is beyond the scope of the patentee's monopoly; . . . . The present attempt is analogous to the use of a patent as an instrument for restraining commerce.").
45. creative user. They emphasize the role of the user as an innovator and his influence on technological design. 46 Indeed, the focus on the user as an innovator is an important step toward illuminating the process of technological adoption. History is replete with examples of users operating technologies differently than their designers expected them to be used. Individuals may use a technology for a different function than the inventors' intended uses. For example, phone companies originally promoted the telephone for use only as a business tool. It was the users who transformed the telephone into a social tool.
47
Yet the focus on the user as an innovator highlights only part of the crucial role of the user in the dissemination process of new technologies. The user can play a role as an innovator, but her role as a consumer determines the fate of new technologies on a much more crucial and broader scale. The user in her role as a potential consumer-even the couch potato-regularly determines the fate of technological artifacts. The user, who influences the fate of a new technology in her basic decision of whether to adopt it, may be a consumer, an employee within an organization, the management of an organization, or a member of the public whose actions affect the decisions of direct adopters. All these share in common their crucial effect on the fate of a new technology. Hence, this Article defines "user" broadly as a user or potential user who may choose to adopt or reject a technology.
The user plays an important role in the adoption or rejection of a new technology. Resistance to the adoption of new technologies takes many forms. Behaviors constituting resistance to new technology include both consciously motivated behavior and avoidance behavior. They include both overt opposition and passive reluctance to use a technology.
49 Individuals who demonstrate against nuclear power are overt rejecters of a technology, whereas passive rejecters include the woman who refuses to buy genetically modified food in the supermarket and the aging writer who refuses to substitute his typewriter for a computer and word processor. All these forms of conduct affect the fate of a new technology.
User resistance to the adoption of new technologies may result in the complete rejection of a new technology. 50 For example, our computer keyboard-QWERTY-is considered inferior to an alternative keyboard-DVORAK-which users rejected. 51 User resistance may also significantly delay the adoption of a new technology. For example, artificial insemination in humans was invented at the end of the eighteenth century, but it reached mainstream adoption much later during the 1940s and 1950s. 52 Finally, certain population groups may refuse to adopt a technology and thereby restrict dissemination. For example, some parents reject childhood inoculation technology when they refuse to vaccinate their children against childhood diseases due to fear that these inoculations may cause autism.
B. Factors Influencing the User's Adoption Decision
Doubtless, price and availability of a technology are significant factors in when or whether users adopt a technology. Price is also closely related to the technology's perceived relative advantage-the ratio of the expected benefits and the costs of adoption in the eyes of the user. The technology's relative advantage is affected by: low price, economic profitability, decrease in discomfort, social prestige, and savings of time and effort. 54 Yet many additional factors influence the user's willingness to adopt a technology. The ordinary user is a multifaceted creature whose motivations and complexities should be carefully examined because of his crucial importance to the fate of new technologies. This section focuses on the main reasons that lead to user resistance to the adoption of a new technology. 55 The dissemination process of a new technology may be inhibited by one or a combination of these factors. Diverse groups of users may resist the same technology for a different set of reasons. These reasons can be divided into two categories: the novel nature of the technology and the perceived consequences.
Novelty and User Resistance
Users resist technology because of its "newness." Yet, their resistance to "newness" is comprised of different reasons. First, some individuals may resist the newness of the hardware or the process of the new technology. 56 readers such as the Kindle, the idea that paper books will become obsolete deters many.
57
Second, newness often entails complexity, and users may reject a technology if they perceive it as relatively difficult to use. This is particularly the case when a technology is incompatible with a preceding idea. Old ideas are the main tools that people use to assess new ideas and give them meaning. 58 A historical example from the 1980s involves the adoption process of home computers. Users went through periods of frustration while they learned how to connect the computers and how to run software. Although personal computers eventually became commonplace in the American household, their perceived complexity was an important negative force in their adoption rate in the 1980s. Eventually, as home computers became more user friendly, their adoption rate increased.
59
A technology's perceived complexity also inhibits adoption within organizations. Bureaucracies function on routine and standard operating procedures that resist change. 60 For example, hospital personnel impeded the transition from handwritten records to computerized electronic records. The adoption of electronic records 61 provides many advantages, which include reductions in prescription errors due to illegible handwriting and the ability for authorized physicians to access relevant information about their patients no matter where the patients received previous treatment.
62
Despite these advantages, training personnel to adjust to complex systems is cumbersome. Medical providers and personnel need to adjust to 57. Sherman & Wright, supra note 4, at 28-29 (discussing concerns regarding the demise of books and libraries). As of January 2014, 28% of adults in the United States reported reading an ebook in the previous year while 70% reported reading a book in print. The majority of the population still prefers reading printed books despite a rise in use of e-readers. entering all the required data in the system's preferred format and abandon their own methods of keeping charts; they need to become proficient at using the systems; and both patients and providers need to accommodate to the central place that the computer takes during the physician-patient interaction.
63 Consequently, some physicians rebelled against the newly installed systems and complained that the time required to use the electronic systems distracts them from their medical duties. 64 
Perceived Consequences and User Resistance
Users may refrain from adopting a new technology because they are concerned that the use of a technology will adversely affect either their everyday well-being or will be incompatible with deeply held beliefs. User resistance to the adoption of a new technology due to its perceived consequences can be broken into two categories. First, users may resist technological adoption due to perceived practical consequences, which include both economic and noneconomic effects. Second, users may resist technological adoption because of perceived consequences of the impact on moral and religious values. Finally, users may believe a technology confers a reduced advantage due to its failure to attain critical mass. Interactive technologies can be prone to market failure because they are often characterized by "network effects."
72 Network effects exist in markets where the value an individual places on a good increases as others use the good. Once a critical mass of people use a particular technology, its rate of adoption accelerates. 73 Thus, reaching a critical mass is imperative for the adoption of many interactive technologies. 74 A classic example of a technology dependent on network effects is the Internet. The value of the Internet is a function of the number of people who connect to it. 75 The Internet reached its critical mass point in 1990 with four million users worldwide. 76 Vendors and information providers found the Internet more lucrative as more people were online. At a certain point most offline businesses realized they had to offer an online service because a large percentage of their clientele transferred their purchasing activity online. In addition, when a technology reaches its critical mass, then people are less likely to abandon use of the technology because they become dependent on it.
77 For example, in 2014, it is more costly for an individual to stop using Facebook unilaterally than it was for a Facebook user seven years earlier. nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, and chemicals.
79 Feared risks to personal or family health also played an important role in persuading individuals to refuse using new technologies. For example, consumers' refusal to purchase genetically modified food also stems from concerns of risks to personal or family health and harmful effects to the environment. 80 Similarly, a vocal movement of parents refuses to vaccinate their children due to concerns that autism is linked to certain childhood vaccinations. 81 Other concerns that relate neither to health nor community well-being affect users' willingness to adopt a new technology. Fear of discrimination can play a role in the rejection of a new technology. For example, despite the growing availability of genetic testing, studies show that many individuals decide not to undergo testing due to fear of insurance and employment discrimination.
b. Impact on Moral and Religious Values
Potential users may reject a technology due to cultural, moral, social, or religious reasons. 83 Historical and current examples are plentiful. The Amish community is best known for its religious opposition to technology. The Amish are a Christian religious sect that objects to the use of many technologies. To this day, they travel with horses and carriages and refuse to use electricity and common household appliances. 84 Other religious groups oppose the use of reproductive technologies. For example, in 2008, the Vatican affirmed the Catholic Church's opposition to use of different forms of reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization, based on the belief that every human life, including that of an embryo, is sacred.
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Other possible users may resist certain technologies due to fear that they destabilize important moral and social values. For example, the desire to preserve the uniqueness of human identity and to preserve human dignity motivates opposition to diverse technologies. During the 1970s and 1980s as computers became prevalent, studies revealed that some individuals resisted computer usage because they feared the idea of an autonomous entity's ability to perform the functions of human thought, and thereby downgrade man's previously unique significance in the order of things.
86
Similar fears inspire resistance to robots that can replace human functions.
87
More recently, a different version of the argument was made to oppose human cloning. Objectors to human cloning argued that the replication of OF TECHNOLOGY vii, 10 (1976) humans will undermine the uniqueness of individual identity, pose psychological problems for the cloned individuals, and generally erode human dignity.
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The desire to preserve the uniqueness of human identity is only one social value that often stands in the way of the adoption of new technologies. Another example is the traditional social value of the family as a nuclear unit, which consists of a mother, father, and child who are genetically related. The technology of artificial insemination introduced the ability to produce a child with donor sperm. For over 150 years, society resisted this technology because, since children who were not genetically related to their fathers could now be born, it destabilized the traditional concept of the nuclear, genetically related family.
III. THE MARKET GOVERNANCE RULE
While the law regulates the invention of new technologies through the patent system, the prevailing wisdom is that the market should determine which technologies society eventually adopts. (Aug. 1, 2011, 5:42 PM) , http://web.archive.org/web/201109280058 36/http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/sizing-up-obamas-fuel-economy.php#2038012 ("Any company relying on favorable regulatory structure to succeed is missing the bigger picture, namely, that long-term success will ultimately shine on companies that meet customer demands at an affordable price.").
governance believe that would-be adopters, whether individuals or corporations, will select the superior technology. As long as technologies are available on the free market, they maintain that the market will determine the optimal result for technological progress. 91 Proponents of market governance point to the hazards of government action. Particularly, they underscore the difficulty of distinguishing between user resistance that protects society from costly duds and resistance that hinders progress.
92
Given some time, they argue, technologies that are advantageous to the consumer are likely to flourish and government action will be unnecessary.
93
This Part highlights the problems of relying solely on market governance. First, some very beneficial technologies incur significant delays before their eventual adoption. Second, market governance is, in fact, an illusion. The government at all levels-federal, state, and localalready acts to encourage user adoption. Yet, it does so in an inconsistent and piecemeal manner.
A. The Costs of Delay and Nonintervention
The appeal of allowing the market to determine the adoption of new technologies lies, at least partly, in its deceptive appearance of neutrality. Market choice may seem the natural state of events, but the decision to let the market control and to refrain from government action is itself an active choice, not necessarily a natural result. 94 Moreover, this choice carries with it a cost. Superior technologies that are available for use at times undergo lengthy social adoption processes or are resisted altogether. 95 A lengthy delay or complete rejection of an important technology undermines the overall goal of the intellectual property system-the promotion of progress. This is especially disconcerting because often it is the more radical inventions to which markets are particularly hostile. technology without which many believe our world would be better off without. And some rejected technologies are, doubtless, unneeded innovations. 97 Yet there are still plenty of examples of technologies that initially met social rejection only to be socially endorsed decades and even centuries later. Again, artificial insemination in humans serves as an example. Although many believe that the reproductive technology of artificial insemination in humans is a product of late twentieth century science, evidence of its existence was first recorded as early as the late eighteenth century. 98 Artificial insemination technology can overcome infertility by using a syringe-type instrument to insert the sperm of the husband or donor into the woman. 99 Yet despite the procedure's simplicity and its need by many childless couples, the first reports of significant social use emerged only in the 1930s and 1940s. 100 The costs of market governance are particularly evident when a new technology eventually becomes widespread, as was artificial insemination by the 1960s and 1970s, 101 but fails to benefit generations of potential users. In the case of artificial insemination, the cost was many infertile individuals who remained childless in the more than 150 years it took the procedure to become socially accepted.
B. The Illusion of Market Control
Although many believe that the current system is one of market control, the government actually intervenes to encourage user adoption in multiple ways, many of them subtle and unnoticed by the casual observer.
102 A current example involves the adoption of electronic health records by hospitals and private physician clinics. The government, in an effort to encourage adoption, undertook a variety of measures to encourage the process. 103 First, the government offered financial incentives to doctors and hospitals in the form of extra Medicare payments for the "meaningful use" of electronic health record systems. The government offered the highest payments for 2011 adopters and will gradually reduce payments until they're phased out in 2016. The government's goal was to incentivize rapid adoption by offering the highest incentives to the earliest adopters. Second, the government instituted a set of penalties for physicians and hospitals that do not use electronic health records systems meaningfully by 2015. Physicians will lose 1% of their Medicare fees in 2015 and the penalties escalate for each additional year of nonuse. Hospitals also face cuts in Medicare fees for failure to adopt these systems. 105 Third, the government instituted a support structure for the installation of electronic health records systems. The law provides funds to create regional technology extension centers to help providers install the systems 106 and train their workforces to use them. 107 It also provides support for educational programs for health care professional training through curriculum development and student recruitment.
108 Finally, the government acted to alleviate security and privacy fears. It required health care professionals and associated parties to promptly notify patients of a breach in the security of their electronic personal information. 109 Further, it extended Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA) protections to health care providers and associated parties who deal with electronic health records.
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Similarly, the government engaged in a variety of methods to encourage adoption of new payment systems. Professors Erik Lillquist and Sarah Waldeck provide a rich study of government action to encourage adoption of novel payment systems.
111 First, the government provided the public with information to convince it to use new payment systems. For example, to promote public recognition and acceptance of electronic copies of checks, the government required that the electronic copies bear the legend: "This is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the original check."
112 The government also addressed public concerns over new payment systems. For instance, as the public began to use credit cards in the 1960s, concerns about theft and unauthorized charges accompanied the introduction of the cards. The government alleviated these fears by limiting cardholder responsibility to no more than fifty dollars of fraudulent charges and enacting criminal penalties for fraudulent credit card use. 113 Further, the government granted incentives and imposed sanctions to support new payment systems. offering free bus transfers to Metro card users.
114 Finally, the government ensured the adoption of new payment technologies by eliminating or severely curtailing the competition. For example, in 1863 the United States issued national bank notes, which faced stiff competition from state bank notes. Congress placed a 10% tax on state banknotes, thus making them prohibitively expensive and resulting in their elimination.
IV. GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ENCOURAGE USER ADOPTION
This Part highlights the importance of an institutional actor that will articulate and implement systematic guidelines to encourage user adoption. It relies on Professors Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai's work, which underscores the need to create an Office of Innovation Policy. This type of institutional actor could supervise the implementation of user adoption guidelines by different government agencies. This Article proposes that the guidelines should identify when government action is warranted and when it is not. The guidelines should incorporate action through gentle nudges and refrain from coercive action to encourage user adoption. Moreover, the government should limit its action to encouragement of a class of technologies and should not differentiate between competing technologies. Finally, this Part addresses the tension between this proposal and patent law's rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine.
A. An Institutional Coordinator
The goal of our technology-regulating regime is to promote progress, and this objective is strongly tied to the dissemination of new technologies.
116 User adoption is vital to achieve technological dissemination. Yet policymakers give little systematic thought to the issue of user adoption. Admittedly, patent law incorporates some provisions that attempt to encourage user adoption by encouraging competition. However, patent law addresses only a small part of the spectrum of user resistance. And, again, while government action targeted at other aspects of user resistance occurs on a broad scale on all government levels-federal, state, and local
117
-it occurs in a piecemeal and inconsistent way.
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An institutional actor charged with promulgating and implementing guidelines to encourage user adoption could provide a systematic and consistent way to address user adoption issues for patented and unpatented technologies alike. The goal of guidelines developed to target user adoption is not to set a norm of government intervention. In fact, some technologies are unsuccessful and users legitimately resist them.
119 Instead, the objective of these guidelines should be to identify when a technology warrants government action and when it does not as well as the best ways to achieve user adoption. These principles would improve coherency and consistency in an important area that has thus far received little attention.
Under the current regime, government action to encourage user adoption is highly decentralized. A shift toward more centralization requires institutional change. Detailed institutional design is beyond the scope of this Article, but the following discussion relies on the important work done by Professors Benjamin and Rai on this topic. Benjamin and Rai make a compelling case for the creation of an Office of Innovation Policy. 120 Although they do not address the issue of user adoption, they define innovation broadly to include dissemination through putting the invention into productive use. REV. 2051 REV. , 2053 REV. (2009 . Although recent proposals emphasize the need to expand the PTO's authority, it is unlikely that the government will expand its authority beyond the grant of patents to formulate and enforce rules to regulate user adoption. For proposals to expand the PTO's authority, see generally Sichelman, supra note 95, at 400-10 (proposing that the PTO should issue a commercialization patent in exchange for a commitment to commercialize a product not available in the marketplace); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2011) (arguing for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority); John Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (2011) (arguing for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority for issues of patentable subject matter); Jonathan Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (arguing for the need to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority).
121. BENJAMIN & RAI, supra note 13, at 2. (defining innovation policy as focusing on promoting "the creation and diffusion of technology").
contradictory to each other. 122 They propose an executive entity that would have some authority to push agencies in a way that will promote innovation.
123
Benjamin and Rai's proposal strikes an important balance between centralization and decentralization. They emphasize that centralization allows for efficiency, coordination, clarity, and interorganizational learning, but at the possible cost of bad decision-making.
124
Since government agencies such as the Federal Drug Administration and the Federal Communications Commission have specialized knowledge, which is valuable for informed decision-making, Benjamin and Rai do not advocate an Office of Innovation Policy with the power to block.
125 Instead, they suggest a "Hard Look Review" regime under which agencies are obliged to consider all arguments, even those that do not correspond with their position, and respond publicly to the Office of Innovation Policy's position. At the same time, the specialized government agencies are not obligated to implement the Office of Innovation Policy's position.
126
Although not specifically envisioned under Benjamin and Rai's scheme, an Office of Innovation Policy-type agency could also promulgate user adoption guidelines and enforce them under the mechanisms those authors propose. This could improve systematic thought and resolve coordination and inconsistencies regarding action intended to encourage user adoption. Furthermore, it could also alleviate the problem of capture. Currently, decisions regarding government action to encourage user adoption are often made by specialized agencies, state or local governments. Benjamin and Rai explain that capture is more likely to occur when an agency covers one or two industries and less likely when it has a broader scope. 127 Hence, overview by an Office of Innovation Policytype agency is likely to reduce capture concerns as well.
B. Gentle Nudges
Advocates of market governance argue that while the market will select successful technologies that offer a significant advantage, the government 122. Id. at 4 ("Even when U.S. government entities like federal agencies and courts actually focus on innovation, they generally act without having much awareness of what other institutions faced with similar problems have done-much less coordinating with those institutions. Improving the awareness and coordination of innovation-related activities among federal agencies and courts could be tremendously helpful.").
123 Particularly, the government may be quick to adopt the first prototype of a new class of technologies and make it less likely that individuals will invent or users will adopt more sophisticated embodiments later on. To address these concerns, this Article proposes that the government act through gentle nudges to encourage user adoption and refrain from coercive action that prevents society from choosing to adopt a specific technology. 128 In addition, the proposal is to limit government action to encourage the adoption of new categories of technology. It does not suggest that the government should intervene to encourage one version of a particular technology over another.
Law and social norms scholars distinguish between gentle nudges and harsh shoves.
129 Harsh shoves force change by eliminating or curtailing the older technology or mandating the adoption of a new technology to perform a previously non-technological function. The adoption of digital television is an example of a harsh shove. The government required all full-power television stations to broadcast exclusively in digital format as of June 12, 2009. 130 Consequently, the public had to either purchase a digital television set or connect their television to an analog-to-digital converter. In essence, the government eliminated the option of analog broadcasting to promote digital broadcasting. 131 The public did not have the option to decide whether they believed digital broadcasting was, in fact, superior and worthy of adoption.
To compare, there are many different forms of gentle nudges. The goal of this Article is not to provide a full survey of potential gentle nudges but to illustrate some significant examples. Patent law already incorporates some gentle nudges through compulsory licensing and patent misuse laws. This proposal seeks to expand the range of gentle nudges the technologyregulating regime offers to address the complexities of user resistance.
First encourage the adoption of electronic health information systems. 133 The government could also offer information through an advertisement campaign. Second, the government may take action to alleviate concerns about a particular technology. The government can reduce fears that surround a technology through legislation, as the government did when it enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 partly to alleviate fears of genetic discrimination. 134 The government can also ease concerns through an advertisement campaign. For example, when the government wanted to convince the public to take the swine flu vaccine, it used a massive advertising campaign to emphasize that the vaccine does not carry any hazardous side effects.
135 Third, the government may provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt a new technology and also enforce sanctions against those who refuse to adopt the technology. As illustrated previously, physicians and hospitals that timely adopt electronic health records systems will receive incentives in the form of additional Medicare payments, while those that resist adoption will eventually lose part of their Medicare compensation.
136
Gentle nudges, as opposed to harsh shoves, facilitate user adoption only; they do not coerce social acceptance. Even a collection of gentle nudges, like in the case of electronic health records, does not amount to a harsh shove. A nudge is not a shove as long as a user may still choose not to adopt a technology. The government is less likely to lock society into use of an inferior technology through gentle nudges that do not coerce adoption. Regardless of incentives, sanctions, advertising, training, information, and reduction of concerns, the public is unlikely to adopt a technology that does not confer a significant relative advantage. 137 In a sense, government action through gentle nudges to encourage user adoption is similar to the government's role in the encouragement of innovation through the grant of patents. The hope of getting a patent encourages innovative activity. In addition, the grant of a patent can facilitate innovation because it signals the worth of the invention.
138 Yet the patent system does not guarantee that a specific innovation will succeed. It merely provides a gentle nudge.
Admittedly, although a gentle nudge is less likely to lead to the adoption of an inferior technology, there is still some risk that this may occur. This risk is inevitable, though, and it accompanies technological adoption processes dominated by the market as well. For example, users did not adopt the superior DVORAK keyboard over QWERTY because of sunk costs. Users were unwilling to invest the time and training required to adjust to a new typing system. 139 Finally, this Article suggests that the government should act through gentle nudges only where it seeks to encourage the adoption of a new class of technology. An example of intervention to encourage use of a class of technology is the government's use of feed-in tariffs to subsidize use of solar energy. Users who install solar panels connected to the electrical grid receive subsidized payments for the electricity the panels generate.
140 The government's goal through this program is to encourage use of solar energy generally and not to advocate the use of a specific type of solar panel.
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This is distinguished from government action to encourage the adoption of one of several competing technologies, as in the encouragement of the use of one drug over another where both operate in a similar fashion and achieve a similar result.
142
For two reasons, this Article proposes to limit government action to the encouragement of a class of technology rather than the promotion of one competing technology over another. First, government action is justified as a means to overcome user resistance. User resistance, for the variety of reasons discussed-novelty of hardware or process; novelty due to complexity; concerns about practical consequences such as loss of jobs, sunk costs, effects on personal health and the environment; and pressures on moral and religious values-generally does not rise when users select between competing technologies. User resistance usually occurs when 138. For a discussion on the expressive function of the patent system, see generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 575-77, 594-97 (2006 users face a truly transformative technology-a new category of technology. Conversely, when users adopt one technology, they are unlikely to resist its competitors due to fear of novelty or consequences. Therefore, government action is particularly justified to encourage the adoption of a new category of technology where lack of adoption is more likely to result from user resistance.
At the same time, user resistance does come up between competing technologies in one instance. This is where a technology requires critical mass. For example, Google+ currently struggles to lure users from Facebook in order to create a critical mass of users. Government action to select between competitors in such a case remains inappropriate in light of the general goals of the technology-regulating regime, which seeks to encourage dissemination in order to promote progress. Thus, dissemination of a new class of technology serves its overall goal, but distinguishing between competitors who offer different versions of the same technology does not impact the progress goal.
C. The Moral Utility Objection
An important objection to the incorporation of user adoption guidelines into our technology-regulating regime is that it contradicts the rejection of the Moral Utility Doctrine. Patent owners must satisfy the utility requirement in order to attain a patent-they must show that their patent is useful. 144 In the past, moral utility was part of the general utility decision. The law considered whether an invention was "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society."
145 Thus, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts evaluated the potential detrimental effects of an invention on society when they determined whether they should grant a patent for an invention. However, in recent years, patent law has rejected the Moral Utility Doctrine and refused to consider whether an invention is immoral or illegal. 146 143. One could argue that one version of the technology is so superior to another that its promotion over competitors does, in fact, promote progress. Yet it may be that in this case the technologies are not actually competing technologies, but the superior technology is in essence a new category of technology, even if it accomplishes similar functions as other technologies on the market. For example, most would agree that while both the VCR and the DVD accomplish the same function-enabling entertainment consumption at one's own leisure-they are not competing technologies, but different categories of technologies.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .").
145 149 Again, this argument does not apply to the incorporation of user adoption principles into the law. These principles would help to create a systemized and consistent law to encourage user adoption, but the PTO would not implement them. The implementation would remain under the auspices of specialized agencies, Congress, and state and local governments.
V. INSTIGATORS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION
Government action is not the only way to overcome user resistance, nor is it always warranted. Promoters of new technologies will often try to overcome resistance in order to be successful in the marketplace. Particularly, they often work to overcome resistance due to novel complexity. Their efforts may include design changes to simplify the technology and advertisement campaigns that emphasize the ease of use.
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In other instances, society may require a considerable adjustment time that precludes a hasty adoption. This is often the case where resistance is a result of pressures on moral or social values. Finally, some inventions may be unsuccessful technologies, without which society is better off.
The goal of this Part is to take a preliminary step to identify situations in which government action is particularly justified. These are cases of market failure. In these cases, neither the actions of the patent owner nor her competitors are likely to overcome user resistance. This inquiry is a first step that seeks to indicate how systematic thought about government action to encourage user adoption can be useful. The goal of this preliminary inquiry is twofold: to identify situations that warrant government action and, through this investigation, to shed light on situations in which government action may not be necessary. If we do not embark on a systematic exploration of situations that are suitable for government action, we will be unable to identify situations in which the government action may be inappropriate. This section identifies two situations where government action is justified because of market failure. The two situations underscored are not an exhaustive list. These are cases where technologies are characterized by network effects that require critical mass for widespread adoption, and cases in which dissemination is urgent. 
A. Network Effects: Attaining Critical Mass
Government action is particularly important where a technology that is characterized by network effects requires support to acquire critical mass. Technologies characterized by network effects become desirable as more people use them. Once a technology reaches critical mass, its rate of adoption accelerates. For example, interactive technologies are often characterized by network effects-the more people who use them, the more functional they become. Consequently, it is often vital for interactive technologies to attain critical mass in order to achieve widespread dissemination.
151 While some technologies characterized by network effects may be successfully adopted without government action, in other cases, government action could prevent a market failure.
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The adoption of the Minitel-a videotext system that gave the French population many of the advantages of the Internet a decade earlier than the rest of the world-illustrates the significance of government action to attain critical mass and the ways in which a technology can attain a critical mass. While consumers gladly endorsed the convenience of online plane and train ticket purchase, grocery shopping, and abundant sources of information and opportunities for social interaction, few realized that many of these conveniences were available to large segments of the French population since the 1980s. Minitel 153 offered French phone customers a multitude of online services including online banking; travel and ticketing reservations; specialized information services (finance, health, travel and entertainment); online ordering of goods such as groceries; messaging services (the anonymous sex forums were particularly successful); jobs and classified ads; and interactive games. 154 Minitel comprised a small monitor and a keyboard. It used the phone connection to transmit text to and from the user. 155 Minitel reached mainstream adoption in France by the mid-1980s, soon after its introduction in 1982. Many households and businesses used Minitel on an everyday basis. 156 Interestingly, in 1982, companies launched similar services that used the same technology in many other countries, including the United States, sixteen Western European countries, and Japan. Yet these systems failed to achieve the widespread dissemination enjoyed by the French Minitel. Consequently, residents of these countries waited until the mid-1990s to benefit from the advantages of an online system-the Internet. 157 Commentators raise different theories to explain the success of the French Minitel in comparison to the failure of similar online services in other countries. Particularly, they point to the rapid creation of a critical mass of Minitel users. Minitel is an interactive communication system. It requires a significant number of users to draw in service providers, who in turn bring in additional users. Thus, analysts explain that the French government's monopoly on Minitel services and the initial free distribution of the system to all phone consumers rapidly brought in the necessary critical mass of users. 158 Conversely, promoters of similar systems in other countries failed to meet the critical mass challenge. 159 With the benefit of hindsight, based on the success of the Internet and Minitel, parallel online systems had the potential for mass adoption outside France during the early 1980s. Yet, most of the world's residents received the benefits of an online system over a decade later, when the Internet reached popular use. 160 
B. Urgency
Market processes take time as different groups of users with different levels of risk aversion and technological sophistication decide whether to adopt a new technology.
161 Some technological adoption processes take a year or less, while others may take decades or even centuries. Yet in times of national emergencies, particularly those involving health threats, governments may need to intervene to expedite the market process. Intervention in these cases is necessary because of the dire implications of a market failure to achieve widespread dissemination of the technology in a timely manner. 162 The U.S. government's intervention in the dissemination of the swine flu vaccine illustrates the importance of expediting market processes in these situations. The swine flu epidemic broke out in the spring of 2009. 163 In June of that year, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the swine flu to be the first pandemic in forty-two years. 164 Deaths from the swine flu during the spring raised fears of a massive epidemic that would kill many once the flu season began in the fall of 2009. 165 A flu vaccine was ready by the early fall of 2009. 166 Yet, the government's challenge was to vaccinate the population at large, beginning with the groups that were particularly at risk. 167 Public health experts warned that health care providers should vaccinate the whole, or at least most, of the U.S. population within a couple of weeks to prevent massive outbreaks of the swine flu that could culminate in a large death toll. 168 Under these circumstances, the government could not wait for market forces to take their course. The government faced a double task-to ensure not only an adequate supply of vaccine, but also to create demand for the vaccine by the population at large.
The U.S. government acted quickly. First, it eliminated the price obstacle by providing the vaccine for free. 169 However, it had to do much more to overcome resistance. The government vaccinated school children in public schools and opened centers in many communities during the weekends to facilitate the process of vaccination. 170 In addition, the government engaged in a massive advertisement campaign. It not only had to advertise the availability of the vaccine for free, but also had to overcome fears of the consequences of taking the vaccine. 171 Many individuals were afraid to take the vaccine due to concerns about dangerous side effects. Specifically, they feared that the vaccine was new and different from previous flu vaccines, and therefore, entailed additional risks. 172 The feared swine flu epidemic did not break out during the flu season of 2009-2010. 173 Some critics argued that the swine flu vaccines were unnecessary and that the swine flu was never destined to become an epidemic. No consensus has yet been reached on this point. 174 Yet, the criticism was targeted at the decision-making process and the conclusions of the medical agencies (the WHO and the Center for Disease Control (CDC)), not the government's adoption of these conclusions and its implementation process. 175 Given the recommendations of the medical authorities at the time, vaccination of the population was imperative.
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And it is clear that at that time, absent these steps, health care workers would have vaccinated a far smaller segment of the U.S. population.
CONCLUSION
While traditional critique of the patent system's failure to encourage dissemination focuses on the increasing strength of patent rights, this Article showed that dissemination often fails because patent law largely ignores the ordinary user. The ordinary user is a critical player who determines the fate of new technologies through his mundane everyday decisions of whether to adopt a new technology. Yet, patent law treats competition as a proxy for dissemination and focuses on the patent owner and his competitors, but addresses the ordinary user only indirectly as it views him as motivated by availability and price alone.
This Article explored the reasons for user resistance and showed that these can be categorized into two main sources of resistance: resistance to the novelty of the technology and resistance to the perceived consequences of using the technology. It argued that the technology-regulating regime should incorporate gentle nudges that address the complexities of the ordinary user. This Article revealed that although patent law contains some gentle nudges to indirectly encourage user adoption, the law addresses only a limited part of the reasons for user resistance. And while different government agencies currently attempt to encourage user adoption, they do so in a piecemeal and inconsistent manner.
This Article underscored the need to incorporate a systematic framework of gentle nudges to address the full spectrum of reasons for user resistance. Specifically, this Article argued that government action, through gentle nudges to encourage user adoption, is particularly warranted in two instances of market failure: where a technology is characterized by network effects and needs to acquire critical mass, and where dissemination is urgent and time is of the essence. manufacturers); Mike Adams, Flu Vaccines, Pharma Fraud, Quack Science, the CDC and WHOAll Exposed by Richard Gale and Gary Null, NATURAL NEWS (July 2, 2010), http://www.naturalnews.com/029124_flu_vaccines_quackery.html (stating that the CDC's support for vaccination "raises an alarm about our federal government's scientific integrity, and calls into question its true allegiance and purpose: to protect the health of American citizens or increase Big Pharma profits").
176. H1N1dsight is a Wonderful Thing, supra note 174, at 182 ("Faced with the certainty of a new influenza virus to which a large proportion of the world's population was immunologically naïve, and the uncertainty of the predictive epidemiological models, governments had little political choice but to act, anticipating something close to the worst case scenario.").
